Trade between China, Africa and the Middle East has rapidly expanded over the past thirty years. However, the economic relations between China and these countries has displayed a remarkable amount of diversity across countries, over time, and for dierent kinds of trade. I utilize this heterogeneity to analyze the determinants of Chinese trade with 65 countries in Africa and the Middle East over the period . I nd that Chinese trade is inuenced by three factors: access to local markets, securing natural resources, and foreign policy as proxied by a country's diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The presence of an export processing zone and Chinese FDI act as gateways for imports of dierentiated goods from China. China also appears to be using trade as a political tool, as countries that recognize Taiwan have signicantly less trade with China, though trade rapidly increases once a country severs relations with Taiwan. Interestingly, exports of homogeneous goods to China appear to be unaected by the Taiwan issue, perhaps suggesting that China's need for natural resources trumps any foreign policy considerations. The heterogeneity of trade determinants is an important result given the rather monolithic treatment Africa often gets in the existing literature.
Introduction
Perhaps the only thing expanding faster than China's trade with Africa is the number of news articles discussing China's growing presence on the continent.. Nearly every week there is a new story in the press discussing the ever expanding role of China on the African continent. China has expanded its economic ties to Africa through increased trade, foreign aid, debt forgiveness, and direct investment. Africa is a big place with many dierent countries, rather than the rather monolithic view of the continent often portrayed in the popular press. Given this cross-country diversity, it is not surprising that Chinese engagement in Africa has varied from country to country. The purpose of this study is to assess the factors that inuence Chinese trade with countries in Africa and the Middle East. The determinants of trade patterns with China are examined across countries and over time as well as for dierent kinds of trade ows. The key result of my study is that Chinese trade depends on three broad factors: access to local export markets, access to natural resources, and political considerations. These three facets of Chinese engagement reect the three strategic challenges facing China highlighted by Brautigam (2009): • The need to nd new export markets to fuel further expansion of domestic production
• The need to nd more resources abroad to keep pace with resource demand from rapid economic growth 1 Further examples of extremely high Chinese total trade shares include Togo (53.6%), The Gambia (52.1%), Djibouti (39.5%), Sudan (37.9%), and the Republic of Congo (36.5%)
• The need for allies among developing countries to counter-balance the predominance of developed countries in international organizations like the IMF and the UN.
Though the topic of economic relations between China and Africa has received considerable attention in the media, there have been relatively few systematic studies documenting the determinants of these relations. Most studies have focused on documenting the expansion of economic relations or assessing the impact of these relations rather than looking at why these relations have been growing. For example, Wang (2007) Chinese engagement in Africa is often part of a multi-pronged strategy linking trade with investment and aid. Several studies have examined the determinants of FDI, which can be seen as complementary to trade in the case of Chinese investment in Africa. Gu (2009) nds that local market access is a key determinant of Chinese FDI, with a survey of 80 Chinese rms indicating that access to local markets was the top motivating factor in their investment decision. There is also some evidence of tari-jumping FDI, as Sanllipo (2010) nds that Chinese investment is higher in countries that are members of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a trade agreement with the United States. We see further evidence of Chinese rms investing in Africa to take advantage of African access to third-country markets with the end of the Multi Fibre Arrangement (MFA), a system of textile taris notably limiting Chinese textile exports, in 2005. Besada, Wang, and Whalley (2008) nd that when the MFA expired, many Chinese textile rms operating in African countries with preferential access to developed country textile markets shut down their operations and moved back to China.
The novelty of my study is that it systematically examines the determinants of trade with China across four dimensions: countries, time, the type of good being traded (homogeneous to dierentiated) and the direction of trade ow (exports or imports). Looking at these issues across these dimensions is critical given the heterogeneity of countries in Africa and the Middle East. Some countries are large natural resource exporters, while others represent potentially lucrative export markets. Some nations have preferential trade agreements with the developed world (often going back to colonial legacies), while others are international pariahs as far as developed countries are concerned.
The rest of this paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 will examine the historical relationship between China and Africa. Section 3 presents the empirical methodology and data used to analyze the determinants of trade with China. Section 4 will discuss the signicance of the results and Section 5 concludes. Infrastructure investment has been a common entry point into Africa for many Chinese enterprises.
These investments have been largely funded by the Chinese Exim Bank and include for example a 70% stake in Zimbabwe's only electricity generation facilities among the nearly 300 Exim Bank infrastructure projects across 26 African countries. Besada et al (2008) argue that African countries prefer to deal with China for these projects not only because China does not attach political conditionality to their bids, but also because Chinese enterprises have been able to deliver these projects at signicant cost savings. These rms charge 25%-50% less than foreign competitors, partially by using cheap Chinese labor (often cheaper than even local labor) and partially by a strong past experience in completing these projects.
In summary, China's economic engagement with Africa has expanded rapidly. 
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Methodology and Data Avg. Growth is the annualized growth rate of real per capita GNI for each country between 1987 and 2008. Trade Growth is the annnualized growth rate of total trade for each country over this same period. Trade Share is each country's trade with China as a fraction of that country's total trade in 2008. EPZ denotes the year in which an export processing zone was rst established in a country. CommShr is dened as the value of a country's commodity exports (SITC Classications 2, 3, and 4) divided by that country's total exports. TB is the country's trade balance (in millions of $) with China in 2008 (and as a percentage of GNI in parentheses) Political considerations may also be an important determinant of Chinese engagement. There are numerous political issues that could aect a country's economic relationship with China, but the one that I focus on is a country's diplomatic relations with Taiwan. This is a long-standing contentious issue Year Began lists the year at which formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan were rst established. Included in these diplomatic relations is formal recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign nation, a policy opposed by the PRC. The Year Ended refers to the year at which a country severed relations with Taiwan and recognized the PRC as the one "China." Of great help in establishing this timeline was the Wikipedia entry Timeline of diplomatic relations of the Republic of China: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_diplomatic_relations_of_the_Republic_of_China To conrm the veracity of this entry, I cross-checked each country in my sample with a Lexis-Nexis search of news articles announcing the formation or dissolution of diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
Trade with China is predicted to be determined by three factors: access to local markets, securing natural resources, and political considerations. To assess the importance of these factors, I utilize an augmented gravity model of trade. The gravity model of trade predicts that trade should increase as the economic gravity, as measured by economic mass (proxied for by income) of trading partners rises and as trade costs (proxied for by distance) falls. This model has been quite successful at predicting trade ows and a theoretical justication for this model based on imperfect competition is given by Bergstrand (1985) .
The augmented gravity model I use is:
ln T rade j,t = β 0 + β 1 ln Y j,t + β 2 ln y j,t + β 3 EP Z j,t + β 4 F DI j,t * EP Z j,t + β 5 CommShr j,t (1) +β 6 ln T aiwan j,t + β 7 Ex3T wn j,t + β 8 M EN A j + α j + δ t + u j,t
The logarithm of trade ows between country j and China in year t is a function of log GNI (Y j,t ), log GNI per capita (y j,t ), the presence of an export processing zone in country j in year t (EP Z j,t ), whether China is a major investor in that EPZ (F DI j,t * EP Z j,t ), the share of primary commodities in country j's exports (C ommShr j,t ), whether or not country j had diplomatic relations with Taiwan in year t (T aiwan j,t ), a dummy variable equal to 1 if country j severed relations with Taiwan in the three years preceding year t (Ex3T wn j,t ), a dummy variable for countries in the Middle East and North Africa (M EN A j ), and unobserved country and year eects.
If Chinese trade with Africa is driven by access to local markets, then the income measures in the above relation should have a signicant inuence. Another means by which Chinese exporters may gain access to export markets is through EPZ's. These EPZ's are areas of a country in which barriers to trade have been signicantly lowered (and often eliminated) in an attempt to attract foreign investment.
Thus, the presence of an EPZ in a country may increase access to Chinese goods. This could be direct access through Chinese rms setting up distribution centers in these EPZ's or indirect access through non-Chinese rms that distribute Chinese goods through these EPZ's. Thus, including the interaction eect between Chinese FDI and the presence of an EPZ allows us to distinguish between these direct and indirect eects. It would also be interesting to include data on the amount of Chinese FDI in these countries, but unfortunately, data on this topic is limited. Information on export processing zones was primarily taken from the International Labor Organization's database on export processing zones. This database lists EPZ's by country and indicates the key foreign countries investing in each nation. Further information (such as the year the rst EPZ in a country was established) was found by going directly to the website for each EPZ in a country.
Another potential determinant of Chinese trade with Africa is access to natural resources. To assess this determinant, I construct the variable CommShr j,t , which represents the share of a country's total exports that are primary commodities. Here, I dene primary commodities as SITC single digit classications 2 (Crude Materials, inedible, except fuels), 3 (Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials), and 4 (Animal and vegetable oils, fats, and waxes).
6 If China is engaging with Africa to secure natural resources, then this variable should have a signicant eect on trade, particularly on exports from Africa to China.
Given that some countries have switched their allegiances back and forth between China and Taiwan so frequently, it is likely that both of these nations are using economic tools such as aid, investment, and trade to further their political goals. To assess the importance of the Taiwan issue, I include both a dummy variable variable for a contemporaneous diplomatic relationship with Taiwan and a dummy variable equal to 1 if a country had severed relations with Taiwan in the preceding three years. 
Empirical Estimates
To assess the determinants of Chinese trade with Africa, I estimate Equation 1 using a random eects regression. Table 4 gives estimates from this regression for total trade with China, Chinese exports, and Chinese imports. Looking at the rst row, we see that natural resource production is a signicant determinant of trade with China. When looking at total trade with China, there is a near unit elasticity of the commodity share of exports with Chinese trade. Not surprisingly, this eect is being driven entirely by Chinese imports of these resources. A 1% increase in a country's commodity share of exports leads to a 3.8% increase in its exports to China. However, countries that produce more natural resources do not import signicantly more goods from China. Random Eects Estimation of Equation 1. CommShr is the share of primary commodities in country j's total exports. EP Z is equal to 1 if a country has an export processing zone in year t, while F DI * EP Z is equal to 1 for countries with EPZ's in which China is a prinicpal investor. T aiwan is equal to 1 if a country has diplomatic relations with Taiwan in year t, while Ex3T wn is equal to 1 for the three years following the end of diplomatic relations with Taiwan. ln Y and ln y are total and per capita GNI respectively, while M EN A is equal to 1 if a country is part of the Middle East or North Africa. Heteroskedasticity consistent p-values are given in brakcets.
Countries with EPZ's have on average 37.7% more trade with China than those that do not. When breaking trade down by the direction of ow, however, we see that this result is being driven by imports from China. The presence of an EPZ increases imports from China by an average of 46.9%, while an EPZ does not seem to have any eect on exports to China. This eect is magnied when we consider the interaction between Chinese FDI and an EPZ. For countries that have an EPZ in which China is a key investor, imports from China are 156% larger than in those countries without an EPZ and 109% larger than in those countries with an EPZ, but without Chinese FDI. These results strongly suggest that while an EPZ may be eective at attracting investment from China, it appears that these investments are acting as a conduit through which Chinese goods may cheaply enter local markets.
It appears that political considerations also matter when considering trade with China. Countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan have 46.1% less trade than those who recognize the PRC. Once a country severs its relationship with Taiwan, however, trade with China increases by 57.2%. This suggests that countries are being rewarded for shifting their allegiance to the PRC. Interestingly, the eect of politics on trade only holds for imports from China, with exports to China unaected by a country's diplomatic relations with Taiwan. A possible explanation for this is that a country's foreign policy regarding Taiwan inuences aid and investment from China. The estimates with EPZ's and Chinese FDI suggest that Chinese investment increases exports from China. Thus, a country that has diplomatic relations with Taiwan will receive less investment from China and therefore import less from China. One reason why exports to China may be unaected by politics is that most exports from Africa and the Middle East to China are natural resources. Perhaps China's need for these resources overshadows political considerations.
As expected larger economies tend to trade more with China. A 1% increase in a country's GNI is predicted to increase trade ows by 2.2%. This result is consistent across both exports and imports.
Though total market size matters, average income in a country appears to have less of an impact. For total trade, the per capita income elasticity of trade is not signicantly dierent from zero. Surprisingly, imports from China actually fall as average income rises. This may suggest that Chinese products exhibit some characteristics of inferior goods and nd more market access in poorer countries. Countries that have higher per capita GNI's tend to export more to China, though this may simply be a reection of the fact that in this region, natural resource exporters tend to have higher per capita incomes.
Finally, China has on average 240% less trade with countries in the Middle East and North Africa than those in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Further insights can be gained by looking at the kinds of goods being traded. Table 5 presents estimates of Equation 1 for Chinese exports and imports of six kinds of trade: exports and imports of dierentiated, reference priced, and homogeneous goods.
As expected, the intensity of natural resource production only appears to matter for exports of reference priced and homogeneous goods to China. A 1% increase in the share of commodity exports for a country increases exports of reference priced goods to China by 1.93% and exports of homogeneous goods by 4.3%. Exports of dierentiated goods (or exports of any type of good) to China are unaected by whether or not a country's exports are geared towards primary commodities. This conrms that it is indeed primary commodities that China is importing from these countries.
Looking at the impact of EPZ's and Chinese FDI, we see that the results are strongest for imports of dierentiated and reference priced goods from China. Countries with EPZ's import 66.4% more dierentiated and reference priced goods from China than those without EPZ's. Those countries with EPZ's in which China is a principal investor import 147% more dierentiated goods and 144% more reference priced goods than countries lacking an EPZ. Imports of homogeneous goods from China appear to be unaected by the presence of either an EPZ or Chinese direct investment. These results suggest that Chinese investment in an EPZ is leading to increased manufactured goods entering a country's markets.
There is little evidence of vertical FDI, as Chinese rms investing in African countries do not appear to be shipping their products back to China. Only for reference priced goods does the presence of an EPZ Rauch (1999) and described in Section 3. CommShr is the share of primary commodities in country j's total exports. EP Z is equal to 1 if a country has an export processing zone in year t, while F DI * EP Z is equal to 1 for countries with EPZ's in which China is a prinicpal investor. T aiwan is equal to 1 if a country has diplomatic relations with Taiwan in year t, while Ex3T wn is equal to 1 for the three years following the end of diplomatic relations with Taiwan. ln Y and ln y are total and per capita GNI respectively, while M EN A is equal to 1 if a country is part of the Middle East or North Africa. Heteroskedasticity consistent p-values are given in brakcets.
appear to signicantly increase exports to China (at the 10% level). However, the interaction between Chinese FDI and EPZ is not signicant for any kind of export to China, suggesting that Chinese rms investing in Africa are not doing so to take advantage of lower production costs, but rather to gain access to local markets.
As with aggregate trade ows, political considerations appear to have a stronger eect for imports from China than for exports to China. Countries that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan import 31.3% fewer dierentiated goods and 63.3% fewer homogeneous goods from China. Interestingly, however, the reward for severing relations with Taiwan only appears to hold for dierentiated goods, with a 93.2% increase in imports of Chinese dierentiated goods in the three years after a country switches its allegiance to the PRC. Looking at exports from Africa and the Middle East to China, it does appear that China is blocking some exports of dierentiated goods from countries that support Taiwan. China imports 78% fewer dierentiated goods from these nations than it does from countries that do not recognize Taiwan. However, there does not appear to be any change in exports to China once a country severs relations with Taiwan for dierentiated goods. Interestingly, Exports of reference priced goods to China fall precipitously in the three years following the end of relations with Taiwan.
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Larger economies tend to trade more with China, a result that is consistent across exports and imports of all kinds of goods. Per capita income is only signicant for exports to China. This result suggests that there may be some reverse causality, as countries that are able to export more to China have seen their average incomes rise as a result. China trades more with Sub-Saharan Africa than the Middle East and North Africa for all categories of goods except for imports of homogeneous goods from China.
MENA countries actually import 151% more homogeneous goods from China than SS Africa. This may reect the fact that most MENA countries have more mature economies than those in SS Africa.
Given that China will have a comparative advantage in less dierentiated goods when trading with a more developed economy and a comparative advantage in more dierentiated goods when trading with a less developed economy, this result makes sense. Finally, the fact that China imports 364% more homogeneous goods from SS Africa than from the MENA really underscores the fact that this region is providing the natural resources to fuel China's booming growth.
Conclusion
China's trade with Africa and the Middle East has been rapidly expanding over the past thirty years.
This study used the variation both across time and across countries to examine the determinants of this trade. Why does China account for nearly 38% of Sudan's total trade, but less than 3% of trade with neighboring Chad? Why does an oil producing OPEC member like Angola have a large share of trade with China (27.3%), while a similar oil producing OPEC members like Nigeria trades signicantly less with China (5.9%)? This heterogeneity in trade relations with China both across countries and over time provides an opportunity to identify the factors that inuence the degree of economic interaction between these countries and China.
I nd that the determinants of trade vary across the type of good being traded and the type of trade ow. Exports of dierentiated goods from China to Africa and the Middle East are aected by the presence of export processing zones and Chinese direct investment. Political considerations also matter, as countries that recognize the PRC as China in the UN import more from China than those that recognize Taiwan. When looking at goods owing from Africa and the Middle East to China, we see that China's demand for natural resources is the biggest factor. Political considerations seem to matter less when it comes to securing resources.
Has the expansion of Chinese economic engagement in this region been benecial or harmful ? Lyons and Brown (2010) nd that an inux of Chinese imports actually improves living standards for the poor in the short run by driving down the cost of living. However, the long run eects may be damaging as these imports appear to crowd out domestic competition. This crowding out may be occurring in international markets as well, as Viloria (2009) and Giovannetti and Sanlippo (2009) 
nd that
Chinese exports to developed country markets tend to displace African exports to these same markets.
Increased trade with China could improve long run living standards if it leads to productivity spillovers.
However, Elu and Price (2010) nd very little evidence of any increases in total factor productivity due to increased Chinese trade.
Thus, the few studies that have assessed the impact of Chinese trade have tended to see it as having negative eects. The results in my study suggest that there are multiple factors inuencing Chinese trade in this region, and the impact of trade will depend on why it is taking place. Trade that is seeking out natural resources is likely to have a dierent eect on the local economy than trade which is seeking out local markets or even trade that complements state-sponsored direct investment and aid given to a country in exchange for political considerations. To accurately assess the eects of Chinese engagement in Africa, we therefore need to understand that this engagement occurs for dierent reasons.
